


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
**(Naj)pokročilejšia ochrana proti malvéru**

Martin Vozár, Defense 2019



## Agenda

- Hrozby vs. tradičné ochrany
- Lastline Defender
- Návrh vhodného riešenia (príd'te s nami konzultovať)





# Aktuálne hrozby vs. tradičné ochrany



## Evolúcia hrozieb

- "Bežný" (statický) kód (známa SHA256 signatúra)
  - vírusy – rootkit, spyware, crime-ware, adware, ...
- Enkryptovaný malware (známym algoritmom)
- Oligomorfný/polymorfný malware (rôzne obfuskácie/dekryptory/kombinácie – desiatky/milióny verzií, ...)



- Metamorfný malware
- Zvlášť: Targeted malware




<https://attack.mitre.org/>

### ATT&CK Matrix for Enterprise

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Drive-by Compromise	AppleScript	.bash_profile and .bashrc	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScript	Audio Capture	Commonly Used Port	Automated Exfiltration	Account Access Removal
Exploit Public-Facing Application	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	Binary Padding	Bash History	Application Window Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Automated Collection	Communication Through Removable Media	Data Compressed	Data Destruction
External Remote Services	Command-Line Interface	Account Manipulation	AppCert DLLs	BITS Jobs	Brute Force	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Component Object Model and Distributed COM	Clipboard Data	Connection Proxy	Data Encrypted	Data Encrypted for Impact
Hardware Additions	Compiled HTML File	AppCert DLLs	AppInit DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Credential Dumping	Domain Trust Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services	Data from Information Repositories	Custom Command and Control Protocol	Data Transfer Size Limits	Defacement
Replication Through Removable Media	Component Object Model and Distributed COM	AppInit DLLs	Application Shimming	Clear Command History	Credentials from Web Browsers	File and Directory Discovery	Internal Spearphishing	Data from Local System	Custom Cryptographic Protocol	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Disk Content Wipe
Spearphishing Attachment	Control Panel Items	Application Shimming	Bypass User Account Control	CMSTP	Credentials in Files	Network Service Scanning	Logon Scripts	Data from Network Shared Drive	Data Encoding	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Disk Structure Wipe
Spearphishing Link	Dynamic Data Exchange	Authentication Package	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Code Signing	Credentials in Registry	Network Share Discovery	Pass the Hash	Data from Removable Media	Data Obfuscation	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Endpoint Denial of Service
Spearphishing via Service	Execution through API	BITS Jobs	Dylib Hijacking	Compile After Delivery	Exploitation for Credential Access	Network Sniffing	Pass the Ticket	Data Staged	Domain Fronting	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Firmware Corruption
Supply Chain Compromise	Execution through Module Load	Bootkit	Elevated Execution with Prompt	Compiled HTML File	Forced Authentication	Password Policy Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Email Collection	Domain Generation Algorithms	Scheduled Transfer	Inhibit System Recovery
Trusted Relationship	Exploitation for Client Execution	Browser Extensions	Emond	Component Firmware	Hooking	Peripheral Device Discovery	Remote File Copy	Input Capture	Fallback Channels		Network Denial of Service
Valid Accounts	Graphical User Interface	Change Default File Association	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Component Object Model Hijacking	Input Capture	Permission Groups Discovery	Remote Services	Man in the Browser	Multi-hop Proxy		Resource Hijacking
	InstallUtil	Component Firmware	Extra Window Memory Injection	Connection Proxy	Input Prompt	Process Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Screen Capture	Multi-Stage Channels		Runtime Data Manipulation
	Launchctl	Component Object Model Hijacking	File System Permissions Weakness	Control Panel Items	Kerberoasting	Query Registry	Shared Webroot	Video Capture	Multiband Communication		Service Stop
	Local Job Scheduling	Create Account	Hooking	DCShadow	Keychain	Remote System Discovery	SSH Hijacking		Multilayer Encryption		Stored Data Manipulation
	LSASS Driver	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Image File Execution Options Injection	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay	Security Software Discovery	Taint Shared Content		Port Knocking		System Shutdown/Reboot
	Mshst	Dylib Hijacking	Launch Daemon	Disabling Security Tools	Network Sniffing	Software Discovery	Third-party Software		Remote Access Tools		Transmitted Data Manipulation
	PowerShell	Emond	New Service	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Password Filter DLL	System Information Discovery	Windows Admin Shares	Remote File Copy			
	Regsvcs/Regasm	External Remote Services	Parent PID Spoofing	DLL Side-Loading	Private Keys	System Network Configuration Discovery	Windows Remote Management	Standard Application Layer Protocol			
Powercat	File System Permissions	Path Interception	Evil-winexe	Execution Privilege	Sensitive Memory	System Network Connections	Standard Cryptographic				

## Evolúcia ochrán


- Evolúcia pokročilých ochrán proti hrozbám a ich zastarávanie kvôli APT (Advanced Persistent Threats)
  - Antivírus
  - Signatúry
  - Heuristika
  - Sandbox
    - Virtualizácia
    - OS emulácia
    - **Full System Emulation**



# Riešenie: Full System Emulation



# Čo je Full System Emulation?





## Čo vidí tradičný sandbox?

- 🚫 Stalling Loops
- 🚫 Last User Login
- 🚫 Presence Of Typical Programs
- 🚫 Last Time System Booted
- 🚫 Delaying Tactics
- 🚫 Race Conditions
- 🚫 CPU Core Checks

```
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6 callq 0x100070478 ; symbol stub for: _open  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15 callq 0x1000704b4 ; symbol stub for: _read  
16  
17  
18  
19 callq 0x1000702b6 ; symbol stub for: _close  
20  
21
```



## Čo vidí Full System Emulation?

- ✓ **See every instruction**
- ✓ Manipulate conditions and identify highly evasive techniques
- ✓ “Fake Out” detection without need for numerous virtual instances

```
1  cmpl    $0x0c,%ebx
2  je      0x10000f21e
3  xorl    %esi,%esi
4  movq    %r15,%rdi
5  xorl    %eax,%eax
6  callq   0x100070478 ; symbol stub for: _open
7  movl    %eax,%r12d
8  testl   %eax,%eax
9  js      0x10000f21e
10 leaq    0xfffff70(%rbp),%rcx
11 movq    %rcx,0xfffffec0(%rbp)
12 movl    $0x00000050,%edx
13 movq    %rcx,%rsi
14 movl    %eax,%edi
15 callq   0x1000704b4 ; symbol stub for: _read
16 movq    %rax,%r13
17 movl    %eax,%r14d
18 movl    %r12d,%edi
19 callq   0x1000702b6 ; symbol stub for: _close
20 cmpl    $0x02,%r13d
21 jle     0x10000f21e
```



Konkrétne riešenie:  
**Lastline Defender**



## Kto je Lastline

- Spoločnosť založená v 2011 troma z 10 top bezpečnostných akademikov na svete
- Podporená dostatočným kapitálom
- Vysoký nárast predaja year-to-year
- Viac ako 5 miliónov chránených používateľov\*
- Viac ako 100 zamestnancov celosvetovo
- Technologický líder (NSS Labs, Forrester, Frost&Sullivan), patentované riešenia
- 250+ enterprise zákazníkov, 25+ technologických/OEM/servisných partnerov
- Víťaz prestížnych priemyselných ocenení



\*licencovanie

SOITRON\*



## NSS Labs – Breach Detection Systems

- Nezávislé testovanie: 100% úspešnosť identifikácie škodlivého kódu a hrozieb (100/100/0)


2016






2017



## Produkt – Lastline Defender – Ochrana na viacerých frontoch




## Lastline Defender – základné stavebné prvky / nasadenie

 Sensor	Sonda v sieti analyzujúca <b>sieťovú premávku, email, web, súbory</b> . Extrahuje z premávky objekty a informácie a analyzuje ich.
 Manager	<b>Koreluje threat events z rôznych zdrojov do incidentov</b> , obsahuje databázu incidentov a nastavení, spravuje pripojené senzory a engines.
 Engine	Analyzuje vzorky pomocou <b>FULL SYSTEM EMULATION</b> technológie ( <b>FUSE</b> )




# On-Premise






# Distributed Detection – Central Analysis




Sensors Status: UP: 1 / 1 MONITORING: 1 / 1 ICAP: 0 / 1 MAIL: 1 / 1 INTEGRATIONS: 1 / 1

### Infections in your network




### Detected threats




### New unique detections

TIME	SCORE	DETECTION	THREAT	TYPE	REFERENCE
2019-10-31	65	llrules:1547129337431	NMAP	Lastline network signature	Event
5 days ago	25	llrules:10896391770652	SUSPICIOUS PASSWO...	Lastline network signature	Event
Today	25	jumpercursos.com.br	PHISHING	Blacklist	Event
5 days ago	25	llrules:10896309813532	SUSPICIOUS PASSWO...	Lastline network signature	Event
Today	22	momo2.test.zinimedia.com	URLHAUS BLACKLIST...	Blacklist	Event
Today	22	test.devel8.com	URLHAUS BLACKLIST...	Blacklist	Event
Today	22	youronlinempire.com	URLHAUS BLACKLIST...	Blacklist	Event


### Downloaded files graph




### Traffic processed



### Application layer protocols



### Mail attachments graph



### Mail Received



### Active intrusions in my network

3 ↓ 1

All active intrusions >

3 ↓ 1

Unassigned >

1 - 0

High Impact unassigned

2 ↓ 1

Med/Low unassigned

### Top 5 open & unassigned intrusions

	Intrusion ID: 4881cd73731245fda50e34f020c0de34 November 02, 04:16:07	Stage 3 of 8 Command and Control		
	Intrusion ID: 673f50842261422fa2a95bd7c6b37eeb September 12, 16:33:06	NaN		
	Intrusion ID: 3668802e4efd402695df14f3dbb070a8 October 30, 11:50:21	NaN		

Showing 3 of 3 unassigned intrusions [Go to Intrusions Overview](#) >

### My work

0 Assigned



No intrusions assigned

### Hosts in my network

544 ↑ 3

Monitored hosts

43 ↓ 15

Hosts with threats >

5 - 0

High impact open >

### Top open threats



#### Top 10 threats

- 8 - Unknown Crypto Miner
- 5 - URLhaus blacklisted host
- 4 - Potential ThinkPHP RCE Exploitation Attempt
- 4 - ETERNALBLUE
- 4 - Phishing
- 3 - SQL Injection
- 2 - Phishing

### Quick actions

< 92 **Intrusion ID: c0de34**  
2019-11-02 - 2019-11-06

Latest stage: Command and control | Affected hosts: 2 | Threats: 2 | State: Open | Assignee: Unassigned

- Overview
- Hosts
- Timeline
- History
- Evidence
- Incidents
- Mail

### Overview

#### Threats and hosts




Impact: High Medium Low

#### Attack stages

- delivery
  - exploitation
  - command and control 2 Hosts
  - credential access
  - discovery
  - lateral movement
  - collection
  - exfiltration
- Activity No Activity

#### Intrusion blueprint



## Klíčové vlastnosti

1. Full System Emulation (FUSE)
2. Actionable Threat Intelligence
3. API (integrácia)



## #1 FUSE: Príklad PAFISH (tradičný sandbox)

```
C:\Users\dirkb\Desktop\PAFish\pafish.exe
[*] Looking for VBoxTray windows ... OK
[*] Looking for VBox network share ... OK
[*] Looking for VBox processes (vboxservice.exe, vboxtray.exe) ... OK
[*] Looking for VBox devices using WMI ... OK

[-] VMware detection
[*] Scsi port 0,1,2 ->bus->target id->logical unit id-> 0 identifier ... traced!
[*] Reg key (HKLM\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools) ... traced!
[*] Looking for C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\vmmouse.sys ... traced!
[*] Looking for C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\vmhgfs.sys ... traced!
[*] Looking for a MAC address starting with 00:05:69, 00:0C:29, 00:1C:14 or 00:50:56 ... traced!
[*] Looking for network adapter name ... OK
[*] Looking for pseudo devices ... traced!
[*] Looking for VMware serial number ... traced!

[-] Qemu detection
[*] Scsi port->bus->target id->logical unit id-> 0 identifier ... OK
[*] Reg key (HKLM\HARDWARE\Description\System "SystemBiosVersion") ... OK
[*] cpuid CPU brand string 'QEMU Virtual CPU' ... OK

[-] Bochs detection
[*] Reg key (HKLM\HARDWARE\Description\System "SystemBiosVersion") ... OK
[*] cpuid AMD wrong value for processor name ... OK
[*] cpuid Intel wrong value for processor name ... OK

[-] Cuckoo detection
[*] Looking in the TLS for the hooks information structure ... OK

[-] Feel free to RE me, check log file for more information.
```



## #1 FUSE: Příklad PAFISH (Lastline FUSE)

```
C:\Users\Emily\AppData\Local\Temp\paf.exe_exe
[*] Looking for VBoxTray windows ... OK
[*] Looking for VBox network share ... OK
[*] Looking for VBox processes (vboxservice.exe, vboxtray.exe) ... OK
[*] Looking for VBox devices using WMI ... OK

[-] VMware detection
[*] Scsi port 0,1,2 ->bus->target id->logical unit id-> 0 identifier ... OK
[*] Reg key (HKLM\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools) ... OK
[*] Looking for C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\vmmouse.sys ... OK
[*] Looking for C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\vmhgfs.sys ... OK
[*] Looking for a MAC address starting with 00:05:69, 00:0C:29, 00:1C:14 or 00:50:56 ... OK
[*] Looking for network adapter name ... OK
[*] Looking for pseudo devices ... OK
[*] Looking for VMware serial number ... OK

[-] Qemu detection
[*] Scsi port->bus->target id->logical unit id-> 0 identifier ... OK
[*] Reg key (HKLM\HARDWARE\Description\System "SystemBiosVersion") ... OK
[*] cpuid CPU brand string 'QEMU Virtual CPU' ... OK

[-] Bochs detection
[*] Reg key (HKLM\HARDWARE\Description\System "SystemBiosVersion") ... OK
[*] cpuid AMD wrong value for processor name ... OK
[*] cpuid Intel wrong value for processor name ... OK

[-] Cuckoo detection
[*] Looking in the TLS for the hooks information structure ... OK

[-] Feel free to RE me, check log file for more information.
```





## Analysis Overview

- PAFISH
- Bodové ohodnotenie každej podozrivej činnosti
- Výsledné skóre na základe jednotlivých bodov

^ Severity	⚡ Type	⚡ Description	
80	-10 XP 7	Evasion	Trying to detect analysis virtual environment (window name detection)
80	XP 7	Evasion	Trying to detect analysis virtual environment (user detection)
80	XP 7	Evasion	Trying to detect analysis virtual environment (malware analysis sandbox detection)
80	-10 XP 7	Evasion	Trying to detect analysis virtual environment (installed applications detection)
80	-10 XP 7	Evasion	Trying to detect analysis virtual environment (guest modules detection)
80	-10 XP 7	Evasion	Trying to detect analysis virtual environment (drivers detection)
80	XP 7	Evasion	Trying to detect analysis virtual environment (analysis path detection)
80	-10 XP 7	Evasion	Trying to detect analysis virtual environment (HDD detection)
80	-10 XP 7	Evasion	Trying to detect analysis virtual environment (BIOS detection)
30	XP 7	Search	Retrieving the user account name
30	XP 7	Search	Enumerates running processes
30	XP 7	Evasion	Timing Detection (rdtsc_GetTickCount)
30	XP 7	Evasion	Potential detection of virtual environment (Sandboxie)
30	XP	Evasion	Potential detection of virtual environment (IOCTL_DISK_GET_LENGTH_INFO)
30	XP 7	Evasion	Detecting the presence of WINE
30	XP 7	Evasion	Detecting sandboxes by checking registry keys artifacts
30	7	Evasion	Detecting analysis environment by checking sandbox name
30	XP 7	Evasion	Ability to detect sandbox by checking mouse activity
30	XP 7	Evasion	Ability to detect if Sleep() function is patched
20	-10 XP 7	Evasion	Searching for specific processes: vmmouse.sys (analysis tool detection)
1	XP	Memory	Writing through direct access to physical drives

## #2 Actionable Threat Intelligence



- Correlated APT information rolls up to network incidents provides drill down to individual malware events (multiple events – single incident)
- APT threat severity level identifies high priority infections
- Less noise means quicker remediation with fewer resources



## #2 Actionable Threat Intelligence – Detailný pohľad na incident

Event details

Host IP	10.1.12.101	Event ID	1586
Host MAC	00:08:02:1C:47:AE	Start time	2018-03-23 12:35:02
Destination IP	178.175.138.133	End time	2018-03-23 12:42:51
Destination Port	1012	Connections	2
Sensor	ants-sensor	Action	event logged traffic captured
WHOIS	Lookup 178.175.138.133	Related incident	6

Event evidence

The use of port 1012 in this event matches network activity profiles for 1 malware:

» NanoCore of class command&control : Impact: 25 / 100 Severity: 100 / 100 Confidence: 30 / 100

The host contacted known blacklisted malware domains/IPs:

Domains/IPs contacted include:

178.175.138.133 » NanoCore of class command&control : Impact: 85 / 100 Severity: 100 / 100 Confidence: 85 / 100

178.175.138.133 » NetwoDRG of class command&control : Impact: 59 / 100 Severity: 100 / 100 Confidence: 59 / 100

+ Host reputation for 178.175.138.133

Captured traffic

View traffic capture

Quick search  Filter by URL

Links	Timestamp	Bytes Sent	Bytes Received	URLs	Protocol	Info
	2018-03-23 12:35:02	↑ 320	↓ 9,206	0		
	2018-03-23 12:42:51	↑ 320	↓ 9,206	0		

RAW IP


Flow Details

Timestamp	2018-03-23 12:35:02	Source IP	10.1.12.101
IP Protocol	TCP	Source Port	49193
State	ESTABLISHED	Destination IP	178.175.138.133
WHOIS	Lookup 178.175.138.133	Destination Port	1012
		Bytes Sent/Received	320↑/5,504↓



# #2 Actionable Threat Intelligence – Forezná analýza

## Analysis Subjects Tree View:



## Analysis Subject Details:

Analysis Subject 1

MD5	ba4332c134a70ecdd130468f2cfa2c81
SHA1	0a44fde1a022570b72c8558e8528c766a3348b
Command Line	"C:\Users\Johnson\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\5ZY4HSU\doc2007\we8F7hFq6.doc"
Packers	ASProtect 1.33 - 2.1 Registered -> Alexey Solodov
Analysis Reason	Process started

- Libraries
- File System Activity
- Registry Activity
- Process Interactions
- Mutex Activity
- Memory Contents
- Signatures



Analysis Subject 1

MD5	08e834b6d4123f0eea27d042fcea992
SHA1	418848e85671d6a022640b38b51d5b50563930ed
Command Line	"C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\Office12\winword.exe" "C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\Office12\winword.exe" /q /t "C:\Users\Johnson\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\5ZY4HSU\doc2007\we8F7hFq6.doc"
Execution Context	User
Analysis Reason	Process started

### Process Operations

Executable	Operations
"C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\Office12\winword.exe" "C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\Office12\winword.exe" /q /t "C:\Users\Johnson\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\5ZY4HSU\doc2007\we8F7hFq6.doc"	create_suspended
C:\Windows\explorer.exe 12288	resume_thread, create_suspended, create_process


### Mutexes Created

Name
Local\WininetStartupMutex
IESQMMUTEX_0_208
Local\ZoneAttributeCacheCounterMutex
Local\WininetProxyRegistryMutex
Local\ZonesLockedCacheCounterMutex

### Mutexes Opened

Local\MSCTF.Asm.MutexDefault1
CicLoadWinStaWinSta0
Local\MSCTF.Asm.MutexDefault1
Local\c:\users\johnson\appdata\local\microsoft\windows\temporary internet files\content\ie5\
RasPbFile

## #2 Actionable Threat Intelligence – Activity Graph



SOFTON

### #3 API




- ✓ Download malware analysis
- ✓ Integrate with network Firewall, IPS & e-mail security solutions
- ✓ Add FUSE to the Endpoint
- ✓ Events to SIEM visibility/workflow
- ✓ Can update Lastline Threat Intelligence (e.g. reputations)




Návrh vhodného riešenia  
(prídte s nami konzultovať)



# On-Premise







**SOITRON\***